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260619Z Apr 05

ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AMAD-00	A-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	EB-00	VC-00	H-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-00	VCE-00
	MOFM-00	MOF-00	AC-00	NRC-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OES-00	NIMA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	FMPC-00
	SP-00	SS-00	T-00	BBG-00	EPAE-00	IIP-00	SSD-00
	PMB-00	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/000W	

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FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7429

C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 000951

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DEPT FOR DOE/NNSA, DOE/NNSA/DWYER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015

TAGS: [ENRG](#) [KNNP](#) [PARM](#) [VM](#)

SUBJECT: VIETNAM: DOE'S ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL SITE
SECURITY THREATS

Classified By: Jay T. Avecilla, Economic Officer, Reason 1.4 (e) and (g)
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1. (C) Summary: The Department of Energy,s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear and International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Team met with Vietnam nuclear technical experts and government officials in Hanoi on April 18-22. The DOE team recommended various security upgrades at several radiological holding facilities in Hanoi to protect against the possible use of the radiological sources as &dirty bombs.8 The DOE team also met with Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) Vice Minister Thang who supported the U.S.-led efforts to secure Vietnam,s radiological facilities against possible security threats. The Vice Minister expressed optimism that a Basic Ordering Agreement between the DOE and Government of Vietnam (GVN) could be reached following a thorough review of the security proposal by relevant GVN ministries. A signed Basic Ordering Agreement would allow DOE to transfer funds officially to the GVN to perform any needed security upgrades at their radiological holding facilities. End Summary.

2. (SBU) DOE,s IRTR undertakes worldwide initiatives to reduce the threat of a Radiological Dispersion Device Incident or &dirty bomb8 and provides funding to host countries to upgrade facilities where radiological sources are stored and used. DOE initially approached the Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety Control (VARANSAC), Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC) and MOST in 2004 to schedule a trip to Vietnam so that it could identify and secure high risk radiological materials. The five member DOE IRTR team led by IRTR Project Manager Greg Dwyer met with Vietnam nuclear technical experts and government officials in Hanoi on April 18-22. Other members of the team included: Walt Sansot, Material Control and Accountability Specialist; Gary Stubblefield, Physical Protection Specialist; John Haynie, Health Physicist and Hazmat Specialist, and Jay Wertenberger, Senior Contracting Officer. The U.S. team was accompanied at all of its meetings by Embassy S&T Officer.

3. (C) During its one week visit, the U.S. team,s main interlocutors were Dr. Dang Thanh Luong, Deputy Director General of VARANSAC and Mr. Le Quan Hiep, Director of Department and Administration and Planning, VARANSAC. VARANSAC hosted a seminar on April 19 where representatives from VAEC, MOST, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Health and Vietnam,s General Agency of Customs discussed DOE,s IRTR Program in detail. According to various GVN representatives, the usage of radiological materials in Vietnam is primarily focused on health care and food irradiation. VARANSAC, however, admitted that it needed to improve the control and security of radiological materials, but there is little or no funding to do so.

4. (C) DOE assessed the security vulnerabilities of three sites, including the Hanoi Irradiation Center, Hanoi &K8 Hospital and Hanoi Cancer Hospital. These radiological facilities all had strong safety factors and no radiation leakage, but lacked adequate security. The DOE Team recommended that DOE provide funding for security upgrades such as balanced magnetic switches, dual motion sensors, keypads, panic buttons and alarms, and closed circuit television cameras, as well as installation costs. VARANSAC officials were very receptive of the security assessment but lacked the authority to sign a Basic Ordering Agreement. A signed Basic Ordering Agreement would allow DOE to transfer

funds officially to the GVN to perform any needed security upgrades at their radiological holding facilities. The DOE team was surprised to learn that most of Vietnam,s radiological Cobalt sources